and every other place in which he thought that he was likely to be
found, and returned home alike weary and unsuccessful; the other
sat down among the audience of a mountebank close by, and, while
amusing himself in the society of other slaves like a careless
vagabond as he was, found Plato, without seeking for him, as he
happened to pass that way. We ought," says he, "to praise that
slave who, as far as lay in his power, did what he was ordered, and
we ought to punish the other whose laziness turned out so
fortunate." It is goodwill alone which does one real service; let
us then consider under what conditions it lays us under
obligations. It is not enough to wish a man well, without doing him
good; nor is it enough to do him good without wishing him well.
Suppose that some one wished to give me a present, but did not give
it; I have his good will, but I do not have his benefit, which
consists of subject matter and goodwill together. I owe nothing to
one who wished to lend me money but did not do so, and in like
manner I shall be the friend of one who wished but was not able to
bestow a benefit upon me, but I shall not be under any obligation
to him. I also shall wish to bestow something upon him, even as he
did upon me; but if fortune be more favorable to me than to him,
and I succeed in bestowing something upon him, my doing so will be
a benefit bestowed upon him, not a repayment out of gratitude for
what he did for me. It will become his duty to be grateful to me; I
shall have begun the interchange of benefits; the series must be
counted from my act.

XII. I already understand what you wish to ask; there is no need
for you to say anything, your countenance speaks for you. "If any
one does us good for his own sake, are we," you ask, "under an
obligation to him? I often hear you complain that there are some