a captive ought to do, if a man of abominable vices offers him the
price of his ransom? Shall I permit myself to be saved by a wretch?
When safe, what recompense can I make to him? Am I to live with an
infamous person? Yet, am I not to live with my preserver? I will
tell you my opinion. I would accept money, even from such a person,
if it were to save my life; yet I would only accept it as a loan,
not as a benefit. I would repay him the money, and if I were ever
able to preserve him from danger I would do so. As for friendship,
which can only exist between equals, I would not condescend to be
such a man's friend; nor would I regard him as my preserver, but
merely as a money-lender, to whom I am only bound to repay what I
borrowed from him.

A man may be a worthy person for me to receive a benefit from, but
it will hurt him to give it. For this reason I will not receive it,
because he is ready to help me to his own prejudice, or even
danger. Suppose that he is willing to plead for me in court, but by
so doing will make the king his enemy. I should be his enemy, if,
when he is willing to risk himself for me, if I were not to risk
myself without him, which moreover is easier for me to do.

As an instance of this, Hecaton calls the case of Arcesilaus silly,
and not to the purpose. Arcesilaus, he says, refused to receive a
large sum of money which was offered to him by a son, lest the son
should offend his penurious father. What did he do deserving of
praise, in not receiving stolen goods, in choosing not to receive
them, instead of returning them? What proof of self-restraint is
there in refusing to receive another man's property. If you want an
instance of magnanimity, take the case of Julius Graecinus, whom
Caius Caesar put to death merely on the ground that he was a better