transferred to them. We speak of our own foot, of the foot of a
couch, of a sail, or of a poem; we apply the word 'dog' to a hound,
a fish, and a star. Because we have not enough words to assign a
separate name to each thing, we borrow a name whenever we want one.
Bravery is the virtue which rightly despises danger, or the science
of repelling, sustaining, or inviting dangers: yet we call a brave
man a gladiator, and we use the same word for a good-for-nothing
slave, who is led by rashness to defy death. Economy is the science
of avoiding unnecessary expenditure, or the art of using one's
income with moderation: yet we call a man of mean and narrow mind,
most economical, although there is an immeasurable distance between
moderation and meanness. These things are naturally distinct, yet
the poverty of our language compels us to call both these men
economical, just as he who views slight accidents with rational
contempt, and he who without reason runs into danger are alike
called brave. Thus a benefit is both a beneficent action, and also
is that which is bestowed by that action, such as money, a house,
an office in the state: there is but one name for them both, though
their force and power are widely different.

XXXV. Wherefore, give me your attention, and you will soon perceive
that I say nothing to which you can object. That benefit which
consists of the action is repaid when we receive it graciously;
that other, which consists of something material, we have not then
repaid, but we hope to do so. The debt of goodwill has been
discharged by a return of goodwill; the material debt demands a
material return. Thus, although we may declare that he who has
received a benefit with good-will has returned the favour, yet we
counsel him to return to the giver something of the same kind as
that which he has received. Some part of what we have said departs