and can arrange his decision, not according to the precepts of law
and justice, but just as his own kindly feeling or compassion may
prompt him. An action for ingratitude would not bind a judge, but
would place him in the position of an autocrat. It cannot be known
what or how great a benefit is; all that would be really important
would be, how indulgently the judge might interpret it. No law
defines an ungrateful person, often, indeed, one who repays what he
has received is ungrateful, and one who has not returned it is
grateful. Even an unpractised judge can give his vote upon some
matters; for instance, when the thing to be determined is whether
something has or has not been done, when a dispute is terminated by
the parties giving written bonds, or when the casting up of
accounts decides between the disputants. When, however, motives
have to be guessed at, when matters upon which wisdom alone can
decide, are brought into court, they cannot be tried by a judge
taken at random from the list of "select judges," [Footnote: See
Smith's "Dict. of Antiq.," s. v] whom property and the inheritance
of an equestrian fortune [Footnote: 400,000 sesterces] has placed
upon the roll.

VIII. Ingratitude, therefore, is not only matter unfit to be
brought into court, but no judge could be found fit to try it; and
this you will not be surprised at, if you examine the difficulties
of any one who should attempt to prosecute a man upon such a
charge. One man may have given a large sum of money, but he is rich
and would not feel it; another may have given it at the cost of his
entire inheritance. The sum given is the same in each case, but the
benefit conferred is not the same. Add another instance: suppose
that to redeem a debtor from slavery one man paid money from his
own private means, while another man paid the same sum, but had to