both of their essence and existence, it must necessarily differ
from them in respect to its essence, and in respect to its
existence. For a cause differs from a thing it causes, precisely
in the quality which the latter gains from the former.
For example, a man is the cause of another man's existence,
but not of his essence (for the latter is an eternal truth), and,
therefore, the two men may be entirely similar in essence, but
must be different in existence ; and hence if the existence of
one of them cease, the existence of the other will not
necessarily cease also ; but if the essence of one could be
destroyed, and be made false, the essence of the other would be
destroyed also. Wherefore, a thing which is the cause both of
the essence and of the existence of a given effect, must differ
from such effect both in respect to its essence, and also in
respect to its existence. Now the intellect of God is the cause
both of the essence and the existence of our intellect ;
therefore, the intellect of God in so far as it is conceived to
constitute the divine essence, differs from our intellect both in
respect to essence and in respect to existence, nor can it in
anywise agree therewith save in name, as we said before. The
reasoning would be identical in the case of the will, as anyone
can easily see.

PROP. XVIII. God is the indwelling and not the transient cause
of all things.
Proof.-All things which are, are in God, and must be
conceived through God (by Prop. xv.), therefore (by Prop. xvi.,
Coroll. i.) God is the cause of those things which are in him.
This is our first point. Further, besides God there can be no
substance (by Prop. xiv.), that is nothing in itself external to