as their efficient cause their objects (ideata) or the things
perceived, but God himself in so far as he is a thinking thing.
Proof.-This proposition is evident from Prop. iii. of this
Part. We there drew the conclusion, that God can form the idea
of his essence, and of all things which follow necessarily
therefrom, solely because he is a thinking thing, and not because
he is the object of his own idea. Wherefore the actual being of
ideas owns for cause God, in so far as he is a thinking thing.
It may be differently proved as follows : the actual being of
ideas is (obviously) a mode of thought, that is (Part i., Prop.
xxv., Coroll.) a mode which expresses in a certain manner the
nature of God, in so far as he is a thinking thing, and therefore
(Part i., Prop. x.) involves the conception of no other attribute
of God, and consequently (by Part i., Ax. iv.) is not the effect
of any attribute save thought. Therefore the actual being of
ideas owns God as its cause, in so far as he is considered as a
thinking thing, &c. Q.E.D.

PROP. VI. The modes of any given attribute are caused by God, in
so far as he is considered through the attribute of which they
are modes, and not in so far as he is considered through any
other attribute.
Proof.-Each attribute is conceived through itself, without
any other (Part i., Prop. x.) ; wherefore the modes of each
attribute involve the conception of that attribute, but not of
any other. Thus (Part i., Ax. iv.) they are caused by God, only
in so far as he is considered through the attribute whose modes
they are, and not in so far as he is considered through any
other. Q.E.D.
Corollary.-Hence the actual being of things, which are not