different attributes. Thus, whether we conceive nature under the
attribute of extension, or under the attribute of thought, or
under any other attribute, we shall find the same order, or one
and the same chain of causes-that is, the same things following
in either case.
I said that God is the cause of an idea-for instance, of the
idea of a circle,-in so far as he is a thinking thing ; and of a
circle, in so far as he is an extended thing, simply because the
actual being of the idea of a circle can only be perceived as a
proximate cause through another mode of thinking, and that again
through another, and so on to infinity ; so that, so long as we
consider things as modes of thinking, we must explain the order
of the whole of nature, or the whole chain of causes, through the
attribute of thought only. And, in so far as we consider things
as modes of extension, we must explain the order of the whole of
nature through the attributes of extension only ; and so on, in
the case of the other attributes. Wherefore of things as they
are in themselves God is really the cause, inasmuch as he
consists of infinite attributes. I cannot for the present
explain my meaning more clearly.

PROP. VIII. The ideas of particular things, or of modes, that do
not exist, must be comprehended in the infinite idea of God, in
the same way as the formal essences of particular things or modes
are contained in the attributes of God.
Proof.-This proposition is evident from the last ; it is
understood more clearly from the preceding note.
Corollary.-Hence, so long as particular things do not exist,
except in so far as they are comprehended in the attributes of
God, their representations in thought or ideas do not exist,