has animated Europeans in conflicts with Asiatics; as, for
instance, in the after struggles between Greece and Persia, or
when the Roman legions encountered the myriads of Mithridates and
Tigranes, or as is the case in the Indian campaigns of our own
regiments. On the contrary, up to the day of Marathon the Medes
and Persians were reputed invincible. They had more than once
met Greek troops in Asia Minor, in Cyprus, in Egypt, and had
invariably beaten them. Nothing can be stronger than the
expressions used by the early Creek writers respecting the terror
which the name of the Medes inspired, and the prostration of
men's spirits before the apparently resistless career of the
Persian arms. It is therefore, little to be wondered at, that
five of the ten Athenian generals shrank from the prospect of
fighting a pitched battle against an enemy so superior in
numbers, and so formidable in military renown. Their own
position on the heights was strong, and offered great advantages
to a small defending force against assailing masses. They deemed
it mere foolhardiness to descend into the plain to be trampled
down by the Asiatic horse, overwhelmed with the archery, or cut
to pieces by the invincible veterans of Cambyses and Cyrus.
Moreover, Sparta, the great war-state of Greece, had been applied
to, and had promised succour to Athens, though the religious
observance which the Dorians paid to certain times and seasons
had for the present delayed their march. Was it not wise, at any
rate, to wait till the Spartans came up, and to have the help of
the best troops in Greece, before they exposed themselves to the
shock of the dreaded Medes?

Specious as these reasons might appear, the other five generals
were for speedier and bolder operations. And, fortunately for