The Union commander was evidently awaiting or meditating a direct
attack and had no fear except that his prey might escape him. Might
it not be possible to keep him busily occupied in front, while a
force stole behind his right wing and caught it between two fires?

This was precisely what Hooker had been endeavoring to do to him,
but Lee was well aware that what was safe for a large army might
be ruinous for a small one and that his proposed maneuver would
require him to divide his small army into two smaller parts, both
of which would be annihilated if the move was discovered. But
capture or destruction stared him in the face any way, so, learning
from a certain Colonel Welford that a road used by him in former
years for transporting materials to a local furnace could be utilized
to swing a considerable force behind Hooker's right, he determined
to take the desperate chance.

The necessary orders were accordingly issued during the night of
May 1, 1863, and by daylight the next morning Jackson started off
on the back trail with about 30,000 men, leaving Lee with only
15,000 to face Hooker's overwhelming array. The success of the
whole enterprise depended upon the secrecy and speed with which it
was conducted, but Jackson had already proved his ability in such
work and his men set off at a brisk pace well screened by vigilant
cavalry. It was not possible, however, wholly to conceal the
march, and not long after it began several quite definite reports
of its progress reached Hooker. But though he duly warned his
Corps Commanders to be on their guard against a flank movement,
he himself evidently interpreted it as the beginning of a retreat.
Indeed, by four o'clock in the afternoon of May 2nd he became
convinced that his victims were striving to escape, for he advised