of the War at Bull Run (July 21, 1861), but it was his rare judgment
in massing the troops where they could readily reenforce each other
that enabled the Confederate commanders on that occasion to form
the junction which resulted in the overwhelming defeat of the Union
army. This fact was well recognized by the authorities and, when
the situation in western Virginia assumed a threatening aspect, he
was ordered there with the highest hopes that he would repeat the
success of Bull Run and speedily expel the Union forces from that
part of the state.

A more unpromising field of operation than western Virginia could
scarcely have been selected for the new commander. The people of
that region generally favored the Union, and the Federal troops
had already obtained possession of the strongest positions, while
some of the Confederate commanders were quarreling with each other
and otherwise working at cross purposes. For a time, therefore,
Lee had to devote himself to smoothing over the differences which
had arisen among his jealous subordinates, but when he at last
began an aggressive movement, bad weather and a lack of cooperation
between the various parts of his small army defeated his designs,
and in October, 1861, the three-months' campaign came to an inglorious
close.

This complete failure was a bitter disappointment to the Confederate
hopes and Lee was severely blamed for the result. Indeed, for the
time being he was regarded as an overrated individual who had had
his opportunity and had proved unequal to the task of conducting
military operations on a large scale. It was not easy to suffer
this unjust criticism to pass unnoticed, but the discipline of
the army life had taught Lee to control his tongue, and he made