for wagons and cannon, and almost impracticable for infantry or
cavalry. Moreover, many of the men had foolishly thrown away their
blankets and overcoats during the march from Fort Henry and their
suffering under the freezing winter blasts was exceedingly severe,
especially as camp fires were not permitted for fear that their smoke
would attract the gunners in the fort. Under these circumstances
the advance was seriously delayed, and it was February 14, 1862--six
days after he had prophesied that he would take the place--before
Grant had his army in position. By this time, however, the gun-boats
had arrived and he determined to attack at once, although Halleck
had advised him to wait for reenforcements to occupy Fort Henry,
lest the Confederates should recapture it while his back was turned.
There was, of course, a chance of this, but Grant felt sure that
if he delayed the Confederates would seize the opportunity to
strengthen Fort Donelson, and then 50,000 men would not be able to
accomplish what 15,000 might immediately effect. He, accordingly,
directed Foote to bombard the fort at once from the river front
and try to run its batteries. Desperate as this attempt appeared
his orders were instantly obeyed, the fearless naval officer forcing
his little vessels into the very jaws of death under a terrific
fire, to which he responded with a hail of shot and shell.

Grant watched this spectacular combat with intense interest,
waiting for a favorable moment to order an advance of his troops,
but to his bitter disappointment one after another of Foote's
vessels succumbed to the deadly fire of the water batteries and
drifted helplessly back with the current. Indeed, the flagship
was struck more than sixty times and Foote himself was so severely
wounded that he could not report in person, but requested that the
General come on board his ship for a conference, which disclosed