his measure during the Mexican War and knowing his cautious nature,
he spread the news that heavy reenforcements had been forwarded to
Jackson in the Shenandoah Valley. This he felt sure would confirm
McClellan's belief that he had such overwhelming numbers that he
could afford to withdraw troops from Richmond, and the ruse was
entirely successful, for the Union commander hesitated to advance,
and the Federal authorities, hearing of Jackson's supposed reenforcement,
became increasingly alarmed for the safety of Washington.

Meanwhile, a courier had been secretly hurried to Jackson, ordering
him to rush his troops from the Shenandoah Valley and attack
McClellan's right wing from the rear while Lee assaulted it from
the front. But the Union right wing numbered fully 25,000 men and
Jackson had only 15,000. So to make the attack overwhelming it
was necessary for Lee to withdraw 40,000 men from the defenses of
Richmond, leaving the city practically unprotected. Unquestionably,
this was a most dangerous move, for had McClellan suspected
the truth he might have forced his way into the capital without
much difficulty. But here again Lee counted upon his adversary's
character, for he directed the troops that remained in the trenches
to keep up a continuous feint of attacking the Union left wing, in
the hope that this show of force would cause McClellan to look to
his safety in that quarter, which is precisely what he did. Indeed,
he was still busy reporting the threatening movements against his
left, when Lee and Jackson's combined force of 55,000 men fell
upon his right with fearful effect at Gaines' Mill (June 27, 1862).
From that moment his campaign for the capture of Richmond became
a struggle to save his own army from capture or destruction.

The only safety lay in flight but at the moment of defeat and