the Commander-in-Chief or asking favors of any kind. All this was
known to Lee but this unexpected meeting at a moment when privates
were being mowed down like grass was a terrible shock and strain.
Nevertheless, it was characteristic of the man that no change was
made in the orders of the Rockbridge battery, which continued on its
way to the post of danger and, with young Lee, gallantly performed
the work he had called on it to do.

By night the Confederates still held the field, but the struggle
had cost them nearly 11,000 men, reducing their force to less than
45,000, while McClellan, despite even heavier losses, had more than
74,000 left. Lee, accordingly, withdrew his army under cover of
darkness to another part of the field and again awaited attack. But
McClellan neither attacked nor attempted anything like a pursuit
until his opponent was safely out of reach, being well satisfied
with having checked the advance of his formidable foe and spoiled
his plans. This he was certainly entitled to claim, for Lee's
campaign against Maryland and Pennsylvania was effectually balked
by his enforced retreat.

Indeed, it is quite possible that had McClellan been adventurous he
might have ended the war at Antietam, for the day after the battle
he outnumbered his opponents at least two to one and possessed
enormous advantage in the way of equipment and supplies. But the
Union commander, though he possessed a genius for army organization
and knew the art of inspiring confidence in his men, was no match
for Lee in the field, and he probably realized this. At all events,
he displayed no anxiety to renew hostilities and when urged, and at
last positively ordered to advance, he argued, protested, offered
excuses for delay and in fact did everything but obey.