portion of the remainder has given rise to misconceptions among
intelligent and impartial critics, whom I do not here mention with
that praise which is their due, but who will find that their
suggestions have been attended to in the work itself.

[*Footnote: The only addition, properly so called--and that only in
the method of proof--which I have made in the present edition, consists
of a new refutation of psychological idealism, and a strict
demonstration--the only one possible, as I believe--of the objective
reality of external intuition. However harmless idealism may be
considered--although in reality it is not so--in regard to the
essential ends of metaphysics, it must still remain a scandal to
philosophy and to the general human reason to be obliged to assume,
as an article of mere belief, the existence of things external to
ourselves (from which, yet, we derive the whole material of
cognition for the internal sense), and not to be able to oppose a
satisfactory proof to any one who may call it in question. As there
is some obscurity of expression in the demonstration as it stands in
the text, I propose to alter the passage in question as follows:
"But this permanent cannot be an intuition in me. For all the
determining grounds of my existence which can be found in me are
representations and, as such, do themselves require a permanent,
distinct from them, which may determine my existence in relation to
their changes, that is, my existence in time, wherein they change."
It may, probably, be urged in opposition to this proof that, after
all, I am only conscious immediately of that which is in me, that is,
of my representation of external things, and that, consequently, it
must always remain uncertain whether anything corresponding to this
representation does or does not exist externally to me. But I am
conscious, through internal experience, of my existence in time