circumstances of society; the various consequences of any
practice; the various interests which may be proposed; these, on
many occasions, are doubtful, and subject to great discussion and
inquiry. The object of municipal laws is to fix all the questions
with regard to justice: the debates of civilians; the reflections
of politicians; the precedents of history and public records, are
all directed to the same purpose. And a very accurate REASON or
JUDGEMENT is often requisite, to give the true determination,
amidst such intricate doubts arising from obscure or opposite
utilities.

But though reason, when fully assisted and improved, be
sufficient to instruct us in the pernicious or useful tendency of
qualities and actions; it is not alone sufficient to produce any
moral blame or approbation. Utility is only a tendency to a
certain end; and were the end totally indifferent to us, we
should feel the same indifference towards the means. It is
requisite a SENTIMENT should here display itself, in order to
give a preference to the useful above the pernicious tendencies.
This SENTIMENT can be no other than a feeling for the happiness
of mankind, and a resentment of their misery; since these are the
different ends which virtue and vice have a tendency to promote.
Here therefore REASON instructs us in the several tendencies of
actions, and HUMANITY makes a distinction in favour of those
which are useful and beneficial.

This partition between the faculties of understanding and
sentiment, in all moral decisions, seems clear from the preceding
hypothesis. But I shall suppose that hypothesis false: it will
then be requisite to look out for some other theory that may be