abstruse here, you need only conclude that your turn of mind is
not suited to the moral sciences.

II. When a man, at any time, deliberates concerning his own
conduct (as, whether he had better, in a particular emergence,
assist a brother or a benefactor), he must consider these
separate relations, with all the circumstances and situations of
the persons, in order to determine the superior duty and
obligation; and in order to determine the proportion of lines in
any triangle, it is necessary to examine the nature of that
figure, and the relation which its several parts bear to each
other. But notwithstanding this appearing similarity in the two
cases, there is, at bottom, an extreme difference between them. A
speculative reasoner concerning triangles or circles considers
the several known and given relations of the parts of these
figures; and thence infers some unknown relation, which is
dependent on the former. But in moral deliberations we must be
acquainted beforehand with all the objects, and all their
relations to each other; and from a comparison of the whole, fix
our choice or approbation. No new fact to be ascertained; no new
relation to be discovered. All the circumstances of the case are
supposed to be laid before us, ere we can fix any sentence of
blame or approbation. If any material circumstance be yet unknown
or doubtful, we must first employ our inquiry or intellectual
faculties to assure us of it; and must suspend for a time all
moral decision or sentiment. While we are ignorant whether a man
were aggressor or not, how can we determine whether the person
who killed him be criminal or innocent? But after every
circumstance, every relation is known, the understanding has no
further room to operate, nor any object on which it could employ