IV. Inanimate objects may bear to each other all the same
relations which we observe in moral agents; though the former can
never be the object of love or hatred, nor are consequently
susceptible of merit or iniquity. A young tree, which over-tops
and destroys its parent, stands in all the same relations with
Nero, when he murdered Agrippina; and if morality consisted
merely in relations, would no doubt be equally criminal.

V. It appears evident that--the ultimate ends of human actions
can never, in any case, be accounted for by reason, but recommend
themselves entirely to the sentiments and affections of mankind,
without any dependance on the intellectual faculties. Ask a man
WHY HE USES EXERCISE; he will answer, BECAUSE HE DESIRES TO KEEP
HIS HEALTH. If you then enquire, WHY HE DESIRES HEALTH, he will
readily reply, BECAUSE SICKNESS IS PAINFUL. If you push your
enquiries farther, and desire a reason WHY HE HATES PAIN, it is
impossible he can ever give any. This is an ultimate end, and is
never referred to any other object.

Perhaps to your second question, WHY HE DESIRES HEALTH, he may
also reply, that IT IS NECESSARY FOR THE EXERCISE OF HIS CALLING.
If you ask, WHY HE IS ANXIOUS ON THAT HEAD, he will answer,
BECAUSE HE DESIRES TO GET MONEY. If you demand WHY? IT IS THE
INSTRUMENT OF PLEASURE, says he. And beyond this it is an
absurdity to ask for a reason. It is impossible there can be a
progress

IN INFINITUM; and that one thing can always be a reason why
another is desired. Something must be desirable on its own