holy and sacred. Such reflections as these, in the mouth of a
philosopher, one may safely say, are too obvious to have any
influence; because they must always, to every man, occur at first
sight; and where they prevail not, of themselves, they are surely
obstructed by education, prejudice, and passion, not by ignorance
or mistake.

It may appear to a careless view, or rather a too abstracted
reflection, that there enters a like superstition into all the
sentiments of justice; and that, if a man expose its object, or
what we call property, to the same scrutiny of sense and science,
he will not, by the most accurate enquiry, find any foundation
for the difference made by moral sentiment. I may lawfully
nourish myself from this tree; but the fruit of another of the
same species, ten paces off, it is criminal for me to touch. Had
I worn this apparel an hour ago, I had merited the severest
punishment; but a man, by pronouncing a few magical syllables,
has now rendered it fit for my use and service. Were this house
placed in the neighbouring territory, it had been immoral for me
to dwell in it; but being built on this side the river, it is
subject to a different municipal law, and by its becoming mine I
incur no blame or censure. The same species of reasoning it may
be thought, which so successfully exposes superstition, is also
applicable to justice; nor is it possible, in the one case more
than in the other, to point out, in the object, that precise
quality or circumstance, which is the foundation of the
sentiment.

But there is this material difference between SUPERSTITION and
JUSTICE, that the former is frivolous, useless, and burdensome;