of injury done to men; a lively approbation of their welfare. In
this particular, though great superiority is observable of one
man above another; yet none are so entirely indifferent to the
interest of their fellow-creatures, as to perceive no
distinctions of moral good and evil, in consequence of the
different tendencies of actions and principles. How, indeed, can
we suppose it possible in any one, who wears a human heart, that
if there be subjected to his censure, one character or system of
conduct, which is beneficial, and another which is pernicious to
his species or community, he will not so much as give a cool
preference to the former, or ascribe to it the smallest merit or
regard? Let us suppose such a person ever so selfish; let private
interest have ingrossed ever so much his attention; yet in
instances, where that is not concerned, he must unavoidably feel
SOME propensity to the good of mankind, and make it an object of
choice, if everything else be equal. Would any man, who is
walking along, tread as willingly on another's gouty toes, whom
he has no quarrel with, as on the hard flint and pavement? There
is here surely a difference in the case. We surely take into
consideration the happiness and misery of others, in weighing the
several motives of action, and incline to the former, where no
private regards draw us to seek our own promotion or advantage by
the injury of our fellow-creatures. And if the principles of
humanity are capable, in many instances, of influencing our
actions, they must, at all times, have some authority over our
sentiments, and give us a general approbation of what is useful
to society, and blame of what is dangerous or pernicious. The
degrees of these sentiments may be the subject of controversy;
but the reality of their existence, one should think, must be
admitted in every theory or system.