foundation of preference, where everything else is equal; and
however cool his choice may be, if his heart be selfish, or if
the persons interested be remote from him; there must still be a
choice or distinction between what is useful, and what is
pernicious. Now this distinction is the same in all its parts,
with the MORAL DISTINCTION, whose foundation has been so often,
and so much in vain, enquired after. The same endowments of the
mind, in every circumstance, are agreeable to the sentiment of
morals and to that of humanity; the same temper is susceptible of
high degrees of the one sentiment and of the other; and the same
alteration in the objects, by their nearer approach or by
connexions, enlivens the one and the other. By all the rules of
philosophy, therefore, we must conclude, that these sentiments
are originally the same; since, in each particular, even the most
minute, they are governed by the same laws, and are moved by the
same objects.

Why do philosophers infer, with the greatest certainty, that the
moon is kept in its orbit by the same force of gravity, that
makes bodies fall near the surface of the earth, but because
these effects are, upon computation, found similar and equal? And
must not this argument bring as strong conviction, in moral as in
natural disquisitions?

To prove, by any long detail, that all the qualities, useful to
the possessor, are approved of, and the contrary censured, would
be superfluous. The least reflection on what is every day
experienced in life, will be sufficient. We shall only mention a
few instances, in order to remove, if possible, all doubt and
hesitation.