greater. And, as in the former case, the diminished proportion of
rent was owing to the necessity of yearly taking fresh land of an
inferior quality into cultivation, and proceeding in the
improvement of old land, when it would return only the common
profits of stock, with little or no rent; so, in the latter case,
the high proportion of rent is owing to the impossibility of
obtaining produce, whenever a great expenditure is required, and
the necessity of employing the reduced capital of the country, in
the exclusive cultivation of its richest lands.

In proportion, therefore, as the relative state of prices is
such as to occasion a progressive fall of rents, more and more
lands will be gradually thrown out of cultivation, the remainder
will be worse cultivated, and the diminution of produce will
proceed still faster than the diminution of rents.

If the doctrine here laid down, respecting the laws which
govern the rise and fall of rents, be near the truth, the
doctrine which maintains that, if the produce of agriculture were
sold at such a price as to yield less net surplus, agriculture
would be equally productive to the general stock, must be very
far from the truth.

With regard to my own conviction, indeed, I feel no sort of
doubt that if, under the impression that the high price of raw
produce, which occasions rent, is as injurious to the consumer as
it is advantageous to the landlord, a rich and improved nation
were determined by law, to lower the price of produce, till no
surplus in the shape of rent anywhere remained; it would
inevitably throw not only all the poor land, but all, except the