sell, diminishes in the same proportion the wealth of those who
are its purchasers; and on this account it is quite inaccurate to
consider the landlord's rent as a clear addition to the national
wealth.' In other parts of his work he uses the same, or even
stronger language, and in a note on the subject of taxes, he
speaks of the high price of the produce of land as advantageous
to those who receive it, it but proportionably injurious to those
who pay it. 'In this view,' he adds, 'it can form no general
addition to the stock of the community, as the net surplus in
question is nothing more than a revenue transferred from one
class to another, and from the mere circumstance of its thus
changing hands, it is clear that no fund can arise out of which
to pay taxes. The revenue which pays for the produce of land
exists already in the hands of those who purchase that produce;
and, if the price of subsistence were lower, it would still
remain in their hands, where it would be just as available for
taxation, as when by a higher price it is transferred to the
landed proprietor.'(5)

That there are some circumstances connected with rent, which
have an affinity to a natural monopoly, will he readily allowed.
The extent of the earth itself is limited, and cannot be enlarged
by human demand. And the inequality of soils occasions, even at
an early period of society a comparative scarcity of the best
lands; and so far is undoubtedly one of the causes of rent
properly so called. On this account, perhaps, the term partial
monopoly might be fairly applicable. But the scarcity of land,
thus implied, is by no means alone sufficient to produce the
effects observed. And a more accurate investigation of the
subject will show us how essentially different the high price of