been a liberal, if anyone ever was a liberal. In fact, both of these
men lived when men had not 'had time to forget' the difficulties of
government. We have forgotten them altogether. We reckon, as the
basis of our culture, upon an amount of order, of tacit obedience,
of prescriptive governability, which these philosophers hoped to get
as a principal result of their culture. We take without thought as a
datum, what they hunted as a quaesilum.

In early times the quantity of government is much more important
than its quality. What you want is a comprehensive rule binding men
together, making them do much the same things, telling them what to
expect of each other--fashioning them alike, and keeping them so.
What this rule is does not matter so much. A good rule is better
than a bad one, but any rule is better than none; while, for reasons
which a jurist will appreciate, none can be very good. But to gain
that rule, what may be called the impressive elements of a polity
are incomparably more important than its useful elements. How to get
the obedience of men is the hard problem; what you do with that
obedience is less critical.

To gain that obedience, the primary condition is the identity--not
the union, but the sameness--of what we now call Church and State.
Dr. Arnold, fresh from the study of Greek thought and Roman history,
used to preach that this identity was the great cure for the
misguided modern world. But he spoke to ears filled with other
sounds and minds filled with other thoughts, and they hardly knew
his meaning, much less heeded it. But though the teaching was wrong
for the modern age to which it was applied, it was excellent for the
old world from which it was learnt. What is there requisite is a
single government--call it Church or State, as you like--regulating