storm will not leave all else as it is. It will not destroy the
House of Peers and leave the rich young peers, with their wealth and
their titles, to sit in the Commons. It would probably sweep all
titles before it--at least all legal titles--and somehow or other it
would break up the curious system by which the estates of great
families all go to the eldest son. That system is a very artificial
one; you may make a fine argument for it, but you cannot make a loud
argument, an argument which would reach and rule the multitude. The
thing looks like injustice, and in a time of popular passion it
would not stand. Much short of the compulsory equal division of the
Code Napoleon, stringent clauses might be provided to obstruct and
prevent these great aggregations of property. Few things certainly
are less likely than a violent tempest like this to destroy large
and hereditary estates. But then, too, few things are less likely
than an outbreak to destroy the House of Lords--my point is, that a
catastrophe which levels one will not spare the other.

I conceive, therefore, that the great power of the House of Lords
should be exercised very timidly and very cautiously. For the sake
of keeping the headship of the plutocracy, and through that of the
nation, they should not offend the plutocracy; the points upon which
they have to yield are mostly very minor ones, and they should yield
many great points rather than risk the bottom of their power. They
should give large donations out of income, if by so doing they keep,
as they would keep, their capital intact. The Duke of Wellington
guided the House of Lords in this manner for years, and nothing
could prosper better for them or for the country, and the Lords have
only to go back to the good path in which he directed them.

The events of 1870 caused much discussion upon life peerages, and we