principles of Mr. Bright and Mr. Cobden, and were to act on those
principles, he could not be impeached. The law of treason neither
could nor ought to be enforced against an act which was an error of
judgment, not of intention--which was in good faith intended not to
impair the well-being of the State, but to promote and augment it.
Against such misuses of the prerogative our remedy is a change of
Ministry. And in general this works very well. Every Minister looks
long before he incurs that penalty, and no one incurs it wantonly.
But, nevertheless, there are two defects in it. The first is that it
may not be a remedy at all; it may be only a punishment. A Minister
may risk his dismissal; he may do some act difficult to undo, and
then all which may be left will be to remove and censure him. And
the second is that it is only one House of Parliament which has much
to say to this remedy, such as it is; the House of Commons only can
remove a Minister by a vote of censure. Most of the Ministries for
thirty years have never possessed the confidence of the Lords, and
in such cases a vote of censure by the Lords could therefore have
but little weight; it would be simply the particular expression of a
general political disapproval. It would be like a vote of censure on
a Liberal Government by the Carlton, or on a Tory Government by the
Reform Club. And in no case has an adverse vote by the Lords the
same decisive effect as a vote of the Commons; the Lower House is
the ruling and the choosing House, and if a Government really
possesses that, it thoroughly possesses nine-tenths of what it
requires. The support of the Lords is an aid and a luxury; that of
the Commons is a strict and indispensable necessary.

These difficulties are particularly raised by questions of foreign
policy. On most domestic subjects, either custom or legislation has
limited the use of the prerogative. The mode of governing the