bad treaty; it would rather desert its own leader than ensure its
own ruin. And an English minority, inheriting a long experience of
Parliamentary affairs, would not be exceedingly ready to reject a
treaty made with a foreign Government. The leaders of an English
Opposition are very conversant with the school-boy maxim, "Two can
play at that fun". They know that the next time they are in office
the same sort of sharp practice may be used against them, and
therefore they will not use it. So strong is this predisposition,
that not long since a subordinate member of the Opposition declared
that the "front benches" of the two sides of the House--that is, the
leaders of the Government and the leaders of the Opposition--were in
constant tacit league to suppress the objections of independent
members. And what he said is often quite true. There are often
seeming objections which are not real objections; at least, which
are, in the particular cases, outweighed by counter-considerations;
and these "independent members," having no real responsibility, not
being likely to be hurt themselves if they make a mistake, are sure
to blurt out, and to want to act upon. But the responsible heads of
the party who may have to decide similar things, or even the same
things themselves, will not permit it. They refuse, out of interest
as well as out of patriotism, to engage the country in a permanent
foreign scrape, to secure for themselves and their party a momentary
home advantage. Accordingly, a Government which negotiated a treaty
would feel that its treaty would be subject certainly to a scrutiny,
but still to a candid and lenient scrutiny; that it would go before
judges, of whom the majority were favourable, and among whom the
most influential part of the minority were in this case much opposed
to excessive antagonism. And this seems to be the best position in
which negotiators can be placed, namely, that they should be sure to
have to account to considerate and fair persons, but not to have to