himself frequently disagrees. The selection is quite in his hand.
Ordinarily a Parliamentary Premier cannot choose; he is brought in
by a party; he is maintained in office by a party; and that party
requires that as they aid him, he shall aid them; that as they give
him the very best thing in the State, he shall give them the next
best things. But M. Thiers is under no such restriction. He can
choose as he likes, and does choose. Neither in the selection of his
Cabinet nor in the management of the Chamber, is M. Thiers guided as
a similar person in common circumstances would have to be guided. He
is the exception of a moment; he is not the example of a lasting
condition.

For these reasons, though we may use the present Constitution of
France as a useful aid to our imaginations, in conceiving of a
purely Parliamentary Republic, of a monarchy minus the monarch, we
must not think of it as much more. It is too singular in its nature
and too peculiar in its accidents to be a guide to anything except
itself.

In this essay I made many remarks on the American Constitution, in
comparison with the English; and as to the American Constitution we
have had a whole world of experience since I first wrote. My great
object was to contrast the office of President as an executive
officer and to compare it with that of a Prime Minister; and I
devoted much space to showing that in one principal respect the
English system is by far the best. The English Premier being
appointed by the selection, and being removable at the pleasure, of
the preponderant Legislative Assembly, is sure to be able to rely on
that Assembly. If he wants legislation to aid his policy he can
obtain that legislation; he can carry out that policy. But the