still derived an immense income from it. Yet in six years they lost
all their own wealth, sold the business to the company, and then
lost a large part of the company's capital. And these losses were
made in a manner so reckless and so foolish, that one would think a
child who had lent money in the City of London would have lent it
better. After this example, we must not confide too surely in
long-established credit, or in firmly-rooted traditions of business.
We must examine the system on which these great masses of money are
manipulated, and assure ourselves that it is safe and right.

But it is not easy to rouse men of business to the task. They let
the tide of business float before them; they make money or strive to
do so while it passes, and they are unwilling to think where it is
going. Even the great collapse of Overends, though it caused a
panic, is beginning to be forgotten. Most men of business
think'Anyhow this system will probably last my time. It has gone on
a long time, and is likely to go on still.' But the exact point is,
that it has not gone on a long time. The collection of these immense
sums in one place and in few hands is perfectly new. In 1844 the
liabilities of the four great London Joint Stock Banks were
10,637,000 L.; they now are more than 60,000,000 L. The private
deposits of the Bank of England then were 9,000,000 L.; they now are
8,000,000 L. There was in throughout the country but a fraction of
the vast deposit business which now exists. We cannot appeal,
therefore, to experience to prove the safety of our system as it now
is, for the present magnitude of that system is entirely new.
Obviously a system may be fit to regulate a few millions, and yet
quite inadequate when it is set to cope with many millions. And thus
it may be with 'Lombard Street,' so rapid has been its growth, and
so unprecedented is its nature.