suspended payment; in 1797, it actually did so. But still there is a
faith in the Bank, contrary to experience, and despising evidence.
No doubt in every one of these years the condition of the Bank,
divided or undivided, was in a certain sense most sound; it could
ultimately have paid all its creditors all it owed, and returned to
its shareholders all their own capital. But ultimate payment is not
what the creditors of a bank want; they want present, not postponed,
payment; they want to be repaid according to agreement; the contract
was that they should be paid on demand, and if they are not paid on
demand they may be ruined. And that instant payment, in the years I
speak of, the Bank of England certainly could not have made. But no
one in London ever dreams of questioning the credit of the Bank, and
the Bank never dreams that its own credit is in danger. Somehow
everybody feels the Bank is sure to come right. In 1797, when it had
scarcely any money left, the Government said not only that it need
not pay away what remained, but that it must not. The 'effect of
letters of licence' to break Peel's Act has confirmed the popular
conviction that the Government is close behind the Bank, and will
help it when wanted. Neither the Bank nor the Banking Department
have ever had an idea of being put 'into liquidation;' most men
would think as soon of 'winding up' the English nation.

Since then the Bank of England, as a bank, is exempted from the
perpetual apprehension that makes other bankers keep a large reserve
the apprehension of discreditit would seem particularly necessary
that its managers should be themselves specially interested in
keeping that reserve, and specially competent to keep it. But I need
not say that the Bank directors have not their personal fortune at
stake in the management of the Bank. They are rich City merchants,
and their stake in the Bank is trifling in comparison with the rest