very small part of his time; all the rest of his life (unless he be
in Parliament) is spent in retired and mercantile industry. He is
not subjected to keen and public criticism, and is not taught to
bear it. Especially when once in his life he becomes, by rotation,
governor, he is most anxious that the two years of office shall 'go
off well.' He is apt to be irritated even by objections to
principles on which he acts, and cannot bear with equanimity censure
which is pointed and personal. At present I am not sure if this
sensitiveness is beneficial. As the exact position of the Bank of
England in the Money Market is indistinctly seen, there is no
standard to which a Bank governor can appeal. He is always in fear
that 'something may be said;' but not quite knowing on what side
that 'something' may be, his fear is but an indifferent guide to
him. But if the cardinal doctrine were accepted, if it were
acknowledged that the Bank is charged with the custody of our sole
banking reserve, and is bound to deal with it according to admitted
principles, then a governor of the Bank could look to those
principles. He would know which way criticism was coming. If he was
guided by the code, he would have a plain defence. And then we may
be sure that old men of business would not deviate from the code. At
present the Board of Directors are a sort of semi-trustees for the
nation. I would have them real trustees, and with a good trust deed.

Secondly. The government of the Bank should be improved in a manner
to be explained. We should diminish the 'amateur' element; we should
augment the trained banking element; and we should ensure more
constancy in the administration.

Thirdly. As these two suggestions are designed to make the Bank as
strong as possible, we should look at the rest of our banking