that the bitter gift made by Austria of the Venetian provinces, and the
suspicious offer of mediation by France, ought to have found Italy in
greatly different condition, both as regards her political and military
position. Italy is, on the contrary, in exactly the same state as when
the Archduke Albert telegraphed to Vienna that a great success had been
obtained over the Italian army. These are facts, and, however strong and
worthy of respect may be the reasons, there is no doubt that an
extraordinary delay in the resumption of hostilities has occurred, and
that at the present moment operations projected are perfectly mysterious.
Something is let out from time to time which only serves to make the
subsequent absence of news more and more puzzling. For the present the
first official relation of the unhappy fight of the 24th June is
published, and is accordingly anxiously scanned and closely studied.
It is a matter of general remark that no great military knowledge is
required to perceive that too great a reliance was placed upon supposed
facts, and that the indulgence of speculations and ideas caused the waste
of so much precious blood. The prudence characterising the subsequent
moves of the Austrians may have been caused by the effects of their
opponents' arrangements, but the Italian commanders ought to have avoided
the responsibility of giving the enemy the option to move.

It is clear that to mend things the utterance of generous and patriotic
cries is not sufficient, and that it must be shown that the vigour of the
body is not at all surpassed by the vigour of the mind. It is also clear
that many lives might have been spared if there had been greater proofs
of intelligence on the part of those who directed the movement.

The situation is still very serious. Such an armistice as General von
Gablenz could humiliate himself enough to ask from the Prussians has been
refused, but another which the Emperor of the French has advised them to