the shadow of an Austrian. To the simple private, who does not know of
diplomatic imbroglios and of political considerations, this sudden
retreat means an almost as sudden retracing of steps, because he
remembers that this manoeuvre preceded both the attacks on Solferino and
on Custozza by the Austrians. To the officer, however, it means nothing
else than a fixed desire not to face the Italian army any more, and so it
is to him a source of disappointment and despondency. He cannot bear to
think that another battle is improbable, and may be excused if he is not
in the best of humour when on this subject. This is the case not only
with the officers but with the volunteers, who have left their homes and
the comfort of their domestic life, not to be paraded at reviews, but to
be sent against the enemy. There are hundreds of these in the regular
army-in the cavalry especially, and the Aosta Lancers and the regiment of
Guides are half composed of them. If you listen to them, there ought not
to be the slightest doubt or hesitation as to crossing the Isongo and
marching upon Vienna. May Heaven see their wishes accomplished, for,
unless crushed by sheer force, Italy is quite decided to carry war into
the enemy's country.

The decisions of the French government are looked for here with great
anxiety, and not a few men are found who predict them to be unfavourable
to Italy. Still, it is hard for every one to believe that the French
emperor will carry things to extremities, and increase the many
difficulties Europe has already to contend with.

To-day there was a rumour at the mess table that the Austrians had
abandoned Legnano, one of the four fortresses of the quadrilateral. I do
not put much faith in it at present, but it is not improbable, as we may
expect many strange things from the Vienna government. It would have
been much better for them, since Archduke Albert spoke in eulogistic