the most vital function in the new economic life springing up, the
steam-borne coasting and river-trade as well as the purely
foreign trade. That most vital function tended consequently to
become more and more hall-marked as foreign; it no longer depended
in any direct sense on Peking for protection. The hypothecation of
these revenues to foreigners for periods running into decades--
coupled with their administration by foreigners--was such a
distinct restriction of the rights of eminent domain as to amount
to a partial abrogation of sovereignty.

That this was vaguely understood by the masses is now quite
certain. The Boxer movement of 1900, like the great proletarian
risings which occurred in Italy in the pre-Christian era as a
result of the impoverishment and moral disorder brought about by
Roman misgovernment, was simply a socio-economic catastrophe
exhibiting itself in an unexpected form. The dying Manchu dynasty,
at last in open despair, turned the revolt, insanely enough,
against the foreigner--that is against those who already held the
really vital portion of their sovereignty. So far from saving
itself by this act, the dynasty wrote another sentence in its
death-warrant. Economically the Manchus had been for years almost
lost; the Boxer indemnities were the last straw. By more than
doubling the burden of foreign commitments, and by placing the
operation of the indemnities directly in the hands of foreign
bankers by the method of monthly quotas, payable in Shanghai, THE
PEKING GOVERNMENT AS FAR BACK AS FIFTEEN YEARS AGO WAS REDUCED TO
BEING A GOVERNMENT AT THIRTY DAYS' SIGHT, AT THE MERCY OF ANY
SHOCK OF EVENTS WHICH COULD BE PROTRACTED OVER A FEW MONTHLY
SETTLEMENTS. There is no denying this signal fact, which is
probably the most remarkable illustration of the restrictive power