be attended with as great inconveniencies by lodging too much power
in the Government?

218. Qu. Whether the bank projected by Murray, though it partake, in
many useful particulars, with that of Amsterdam, yet, as it placeth
too great power in the hands of a private society, might not be
dangerous to the public?

219. Qu. Whether it be rightly remarked by some that, as banking
brings no treasure into the kingdom like trade, private wealth must
sink as the bank riseth? And whether whatever causeth industry to
flourish and circulate may not be said to increase our treasure?

220. Qu. Whether the ruinous effects of Mississippi, South Sea, and
such schemes were not owing to an abuse of paper money or credit, in
making it a means for idleness and gaming, instead of a motive and
help to industry?

221. Qu. Whether those effects could have happened had there been no
stock-jobbing? And whether stock-jobbing could at first have been
set on foot, without an imaginary foundation of some improvement to
the stock by trade? Whether, therefore, when there are no such
prospects, or cheats, or private schemes proposed, the same effects
can be justly feared?

222. Qu. Whether by a national bank, be not properly understood a
bank, not only established by public authority as the Bank of
England, but a bank in the hands of the public, wherein there are no
shares: whereof the public alone is proprietor, and reaps all the
benefit?