contradictions of human reason, I never should expect any success from
its feeble conjectures, in a subject so sublime, and so remote from the
sphere of our observation. When two species of objects have always been
observed to be conjoined together, I can infer, by custom, the existence
of one wherever I see the existence of the other; and this I call an
argument from experience. But how this argument can have place, where the
objects, as in the present case, are single, individual, without
parallel, or specific resemblance, may be difficult to explain. And will
any man tell me with a serious countenance, that an orderly universe must
arise from some thought and art like the human, because we have
experience of it? To ascertain this reasoning, it were requisite that we
had experience of the origin of worlds; and it is not sufficient, surely,
that we have seen ships and cities arise from human art and contrivance...

PHILO was proceeding in this vehement manner, somewhat between jest and
earnest, as it appeared to me, when he observed some signs of impatience
in CLEANTHES, and then immediately stopped short. What I had to suggest,
said CLEANTHES, is only that you would not abuse terms, or make use of
popular expressions to subvert philosophical reasonings. You know, that
the vulgar often distinguish reason from experience, even where the
question relates only to matter of fact and existence; though it is
found, where that reason is properly analysed, that it is nothing but a
species of experience. To prove by experience the origin of the universe
from mind, is not more contrary to common speech, than to prove the
motion of the earth from the same principle. And a caviller might raise
all the same objections to the Copernican system, which you have urged
against my reasonings. Have you other earths, might he say, which you
have seen to move? Have...

Yes! cried PHILO, interrupting him, we have other earths. Is not the moon