absurd to inquire for a general cause or first author. How can any thing,
that exists from eternity, have a cause, since that relation implies a
priority in time, and a beginning of existence?

In such a chain, too, or succession of objects, each part is caused by
that which preceded it, and causes that which succeeds it. Where then is
the difficulty? But the whole, you say, wants a cause. I answer, that the
uniting of these parts into a whole, like the uniting of several distinct
countries into one kingdom, or several distinct members into one body, is
performed merely by an arbitrary act of the mind, and has no influence on
the nature of things. Did I show you the particular causes of each
individual in a collection of twenty particles of matter, I should think
it very unreasonable, should you afterwards ask me, what was the cause of
the whole twenty. This is sufficiently explained in explaining the cause
of the parts.

Though the reasonings which you have urged, CLEANTHES, may well excuse
me, said PHILO, from starting any further difficulties, yet I cannot
forbear insisting still upon another topic. It is observed by
arithmeticians, that the products of 9, compose always either 9, or some
lesser product of 9, if you add together all the characters of which any
of the former products is composed. Thus, of 18, 27, 36, which are
products of 9, you make 9 by adding 1 to 8, 2 to 7, 3 to 6. Thus, 369 is
a product also of 9; and if you add 3, 6, and 9, you make 18, a lesser
product of 9. To a superficial observer, so wonderful a regularity may
be admired as the effect either of chance or design: but a skilful
algebraist immediately concludes it to be the work of necessity, and
demonstrates, that it must for ever result from the nature of these
numbers. Is it not probable, I ask, that the whole economy of the
universe is conducted by a like necessity, though no human algebra can