from making any more military mistakes. He is presented to you just
as he sat in his easy chair, confounding the rules of war and
bringing confusion on the army. This great general, though he had
never fought a battle, except on paper, brought with him from the
West a new and much enlarged plan for taking Richmond.

General George was on the banks of the James River, with his army,
pointing with his sword toward Richmond, as the heart of the
rebellion, and offering to take it for us if we would only send him
twenty-five thousand fresh men, which very reasonable proposal we
declined. Indeed the general we had placed in the easy chair at
Washington, over George, declared it as his solemn conviction that
Richmond was not to be taken in any such way. That an army so near
Richmond could not take it with advantage. That objective points
must be reached over the right road, not the wrong one. That General
George, having taken his army to Richmond over the wrong road, must
bring it back over the same wrong road, and then proceed on his
travels over the right road. That Richmond, unless approached over
the right road could not be taken in the right way. That General
George had deceived us, inasmuch as his plan had too much strategy
in it, and not enough straight lines. That Richmond, to be taken in
the right way, must be taken by a new general, with a new army, and
according to new ideas. That it was better to keep Washington from
being taken than to take Richmond, though we had a large army
knocking at its gates. This was the military logic of our new
Commander-in-Chief. And this was the great Commander-in-Chief who
was to conduct the war for us on enlarged principles and keep the
nation safe against blunders.

This great general, then, when he had got comfortably settled in his