Think of it, my son, we had 25,000 instructed artillerists in the
forts around Washington. Here was a temptation hard to be resisted.
These men could do good service in the field as infantry; and, in an
evil hour, it was decided to send them to Grant's army for that
purpose.

Then the great question arose, how were their places to be supplied?
How were the forts to be defended, in case of attack, without them?
It would not do to strip the defenses of all troops, and leave the
forts without garrisons. If we did, the enemy would surely find it
out, for Washington was full of his spies, and we should come to
grief. The President, the cabinet, and all the generals, had
resolved, from the first, that that this must never be done, under
any contingency.

But what, at the time, was considered a happy thought, seized on the
government. I have said a happy thought, my son, but it was a very
unwise one. Let the future historian record it, for it is recorded
in the dispatches, as well as in the acts of the government.

Yes, my son, it was resolved, first, that Richmond should fall in an
hundred days, or at least during the summer; second, that to insure
the fall of Richmond within that time, the experienced troops, then
in the fortifications of Washington, should be sent to the Army of
the Potomac; third, that to replace these and other garrisons, a
call should be made on some of the States for 100,000 militiamen, to
serve for one hundred days. To the end of developing this grand
idea, all the old artillery regiments were sent away to Grant. And
their places were filled by an equal number of "hundred days' men,"
nice and fresh, fresh and green, mostly from the State of Ohio.