must be so in the other: And if that absurdity be not clear without a
proof in the one case, it will equally require one in the other. The
absurdity, then, of the one supposition can never be a proof of that of
the other; since they are both upon the same footing, and must stand or
fall by the same reasoning.

The second argument[Dr, Clarke and others.], which I find used on this
head, labours under an equal difficulty. Every thing, it is said, must
have a cause; for if any thing wanted a cause, it would produce ITSELF;
that is, exist before it existed; which is impossible. But this reasoning
is plainly unconclusive; because it supposes, that in our denial of a
cause we still grant what we expressly deny, viz. that there must be a
cause; which therefore is taken to be the object itself; and that, no
doubt, is an evident contradiction. But to say that any thing is produced,
of to express myself more properly, comes into existence, without a cause,
is not to affirm, that it is itself its own cause; but on the contrary in
excluding all external causes, excludes a fortiori the thing itself, which
is created. An object, that exists absolutely without any cause, certainly
is not its own cause; and when you assert, that the one follows from the
other, you suppose the very point in questions and take it for granted,
that it is utterly impossible any thing can ever begin to exist without a
cause, but that, upon the exclusion of one productive principle, we must
still have recourse to another.

It is exactly the same case with the third argument[Mr. Locke.], which has
been employed to demonstrate the necessity of a cause. Whatever is
produced without any cause, is produced by nothing; or in other words, has
nothing for its cause. But nothing can never be a cause, no more than it
can be something, or equal to two right angles. By the same intuition,
that we perceive nothing not to be equal to two right angles, or not to be