circumstances and situations. And though we must endeavour to render all
our principles as universal as possible, by tracing up our experiments to
the utmost, and explaining all effects from the simplest and fewest
causes, it is still certain we cannot go beyond experience; and any
hypothesis, that pretends to discover the ultimate original qualities of
human nature, ought at first to be rejected as presumptuous and
chimerical.

I do not think a philosopher, who would apply himself so earnestly to the
explaining the ultimate principles of the soul, would show himself a
great master in that very science of human nature, which he pretends to
explain, or very knowing in what is naturally satisfactory to the mind of
man. For nothing is more certain, than that despair has almost the same
effect upon us with enjoyment, and that we are no sooner acquainted with
the impossibility of satisfying any desire, than the desire itself
vanishes. When we see, that we have arrived at the utmost extent of human
reason, we sit down contented, though we be perfectly satisfied in the
main of our ignorance, and perceive that we can give no reason for our
most general and most refined principles, beside our experience of their
reality; which is the reason of the mere vulgar, and what it required no
study at first to have discovered for the most particular and most
extraordinary phaenomenon. And as this impossibility of making any
farther progress is enough to satisfy the reader, so the writer may
derive a more delicate satisfaction from the free confession of his
ignorance, and from his prudence in avoiding that error, into which so
many have fallen, of imposing their conjectures and hypotheses on the
world for the most certain principles. When this mutual contentment and
satisfaction can be obtained betwixt the master and scholar, I know not
what more we can require of our philosophy.