evident, at least at first sight, that by this means we can never
discover any new idea, and can only multiply, but not enlarge the objects
of our mind. It may be thought, that what we learn not from one object,
we can never learn from a hundred, which are all of the same kind, and
are perfectly resembling in every circumstance. As our senses shew us in
one instance two bodies, or motions, or qualities in certain relations of
success and contiguity; so our memory presents us only with a multitude
of instances, wherein we always find like bodies, motions, or qualities
in like relations. From the mere repetition of any past impression, even
to infinity, there never will arise any new original idea, such as that
of a necessary connexion; and the number of impressions has in this case
no more effect than if we confined ourselves to one only. But though this
reasoning seems just and obvious; yet as it would be folly to despair too
soon, we shall continue the thread of our discourse; and having found,
that after the discovery of the constant conjunction of any objects, we
always draw an inference from one object to another, we shall now examine
the nature of that inference, and of the transition from the impression
to the idea. Perhaps it will appear in the end, that the necessary
connexion depends on the inference, instead of the inference's depending
on the necessary connexion.

Since it appears, that the transition from an impression present to the
memory or senses to the idea of an object, which we call cause or effect,
is founded on past experience, and on our remembrance of their constant
conjunction, the next question is, Whether experience produces the idea
by means of the understanding or imagination; whether we are determined
by reason to make the transition, or by a certain association and
relation of perceptions. If reason determined us, it would proceed upon
that principle, that instances, of which we have had no experience, must
resemble those, of which we have had experience, and that the course of