inference from one object to another. The idea of cause and effect is
derived from experience, which informs us, that such particular objects,
in all past instances, have been constantly conjoined with each other:
And as an object similar to one of these is supposed to be immediately
present in its impression, we thence presume on the existence of one
similar to its usual attendant. According to this account of things,
which is, I think, in every point unquestionable, probability is founded
on the presumption of a resemblance betwixt those objects, of which we
have had experience, and those, of which we have had none; and therefore
it is impossible this presumption can arise from probability. The same
principle cannot be both the, cause and effect of another; and this is,
perhaps, the only proposition concerning that relation, which is either
intuitively or demonstratively certain.

Should any one think to elude this argument; and without determining
whether our reasoning on this subject be derived from demonstration or
probability, pretend that all conclusions from causes and effects are
built on solid reasoning: I can only desire, that this reasoning may be
produced, in order to be exposed to our examination. It may, perhaps, be
said, that after experience of the constant conjunction of certain
objects, we reason in the following manner. Such an object is always
found to produce another. It is impossible it coued have this effect, if
it was not endowed with a power of production. The power necessarily
implies the effect; and therefore there is a just foundation for drawing
a conclusion from the existence of one object to that of its usual
attendant. The past production implies a power: The power implies a new
production: And the new production is what we infer from the power and
the past production.

It were easy for me to shew the weakness of this reasoning, were I willing