devotee coued procure, would be the handywork of a saint; and if his
cloaths and furniture are ever to be considered in this light, it is
because they were once at his disposal, and were moved and affected by
him; in which respect they are to be considered as imperfect effects, and
as connected with him by a shorter chain of consequences than any of
those, from which we learn the reality of his existence. This phaenomenon
clearly proves, that a present impression with a relation of causation
may, inliven any idea, and consequently produce belief or assent,
according to the precedent definition of it.

But why need we seek for other arguments to prove, that a present
impression with a relation or transition of the fancy may inliven any
idea, when this very instance of our reasonings from cause and effect
will alone suffice to that purpose? It is certain we must have an idea of
every matter of fact, which we believe. It is certain, that this idea
arises only from a relation to a present impression. It is certain, that
the belief super-adds nothing to the idea, but only changes our manner of
conceiving it, and renders it more strong and lively. The present
conclusion concerning the influence of relation is the immediate
consequence of all these steps; and every step appears to me sure end
infallible. There enters nothing into this operation of the mind but a
present impression, a lively idea, and a relation or association in the
fancy betwixt the impression and idea; so that there can be no suspicion
of mistake.

In order to put this whole affair in a fuller light, let us consider it
as a question in natural philosophy, which we must determine by
experience and observation. I suppose there is an object presented, from
which I draw a certain conclusion, and form to myself ideas, which I am
said to believe or assent to. Here it is evident, that however that