proceeding forward; and his knowledge of these consequences is conveyed
to him by past experience, which informs him of such certain conjunctions
of causes and effects. But can we think, that on this occasion he
reflects on any past experience, and calls to remembrance instances, that
he has seen or heard of, in order to discover the effects of water on
animal bodies? No surely; this is not the method, in which he proceeds in
his reasoning. The idea of sinking is so closely connected with that of
water, and the idea of suffocating with that of sinking, that the mind
makes the transition without the assistance of the memory. The custom
operates before we have time for reflection. The objects seem so
inseparable, that we interpose not a moment's delay in passing from the
one to the other. But as this transition proceeds from experience, and
not from any primary connexion betwixt the ideas, we must necessarily
acknowledge, that experience may produce a belief and a judgment of
causes and effects by a secret operation, and without being once thought
of. This removes all pretext, if there yet remains any, for asserting
that the mind is convinced by reasoning of that principle, that instances
of which we have no experience, must necessarily resemble those, of which
we have. For we here find, that the understanding or imagination can draw
inferences from past experience, without reflecting on it; much more
without forming any principle concerning it, or reasoning upon that
principle.

In general we may observe, that in all the most established and uniform
conjunctions of causes and effects, such as those of gravity, impulse,
solidity, &c. the mind never carries its view expressly to consider any
past experience: Though in other associations of objects, which are more
rare and unusual, it may assist the custom and transition of ideas by
this reflection. Nay we find in some cases, that the reflection produces
the belief without the custom; or more properly speaking, that the