from the association of ideas, according to my hypothesis.

It is universally allowed by the writers on optics, that the eye at all
times sees an equal number of physical points, and that a man on the top
of a mountain has no larger an image presented to his senses, than when
he is cooped up in the narrowest court or chamber. It is only by
experience that he infers the greatness of the object from some peculiar
qualities of the image; and this inference of the judgment he confounds
with sensation, as is common on other occasions. Now it is evident, that
the inference of the judgment is here much more lively than what is usual
in our common reasonings, and that a man has a more vivid conception of
the vast extent of the ocean from the image he receives by the eye, when
he stands on the top of the high promontory, than merely from hearing the
roaring of the waters. He feels a more sensible pleasure from its
magnificence; which is a proof of a more lively idea: And he confounds
his judgment with sensation, which is another proof of it. But as the
inference is equally certain and immediate in both cases, this superior
vivacity of our conception in one case can proceed from nothing but this,
that in drawing an inference from the sight, beside the customary
conjunction, there is also a resemblance betwixt the image and the object
we infer; which strengthens the relation, and conveys the vivacity of the
impression to the related idea with an easier and more natural movement.

No weakness of human nature is more universal and conspicuous than what
we commonly call CREDULITY, or a too easy faith in the testimony of
others; and this weakness is also very naturally accounted for from the
influence of resemblance. When we receive any matter of fact upon human
testimony, our faith arises from the very same origin as our inferences
from causes to effects, and from effects to causes; nor is there anything
but our experience of the governing principles of human nature, which can