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A Treatise of Human Nature by David Hume
page 20 of 704 (02%)
disputes concerning it, and win render this principle of more use in our
reasonings, than it seems hitherto to have been.



SECT. II. DIVISION OF THE SUBJECT.


Since it appears, that our simple impressions are prior to their
correspondent ideas, and that the exceptions are very rare, method seems
to require we should examine our impressions, before we consider our
ideas. Impressions way be divided into two kinds, those Of SENSATION and
those of REFLEXION. The first kind arises in the soul originally, from
unknown causes. The second is derived in a great measure from our ideas,
and that in the following order. An impression first strikes upon the
senses, and makes us perceive heat or cold, thirst or hunger, pleasure or
pain of some kind or other. Of this impression there is a copy taken by
the mind, which remains after the impression ceases; and this we call an
idea. This idea of pleasure or pain, when it returns upon the soul,
produces the new impressions of desire and aversion, hope and fear, which
may properly be called impressions of reflexion, because derived from it.
These again are copied by the memory and imagination, and become ideas;
which perhaps in their turn give rise to other impressions and ideas. So
that the impressions of reflexion are only antecedent to their
correspondent ideas; but posterior to those of sensation, and derived
from them. The examination of our sensations belongs more to anatomists
and natural philosophers than to moral; and therefore shall not at
present be entered upon. And as the impressions of reflexion, viz.
passions, desires, and emotions, which principally deserve our attention,
arise mostly from ideas, it will be necessary to reverse that method,
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