certain light, and as the object continues the same in all its different
situations, it is easy to imagine how such an influence of objects upon
one another may connect them in the imagination.

We may carry this farther, and remark, not only that two objects are
connected by the relation of cause and effect, when the one produces a
motion or any action in the other, but also when it has a power of
producing it. And this we may observe to be the source of all the
relation, of interest and duty, by which men influence each other in
society, and are placed in the ties of government and subordination. A
master is such-a-one as by his situation, arising either from force or
agreement, has a power of directing in certain particulars the actions of
another, whom we call servant. A judge is one, who in all disputed cases
can fix by his opinion the possession or property of any thing betwixt
any members of the society. When a person is possessed of any power,
there is no more required to convert it into action, but the exertion of
the will; and that in every case is considered as possible, and in many
as probable; especially in the case of authority, where the obedience of
the subject is a pleasure and advantage to the superior.

These are therefore the principles of union or cohesion among our simple
ideas, and in the imagination supply the place of that inseparable
connexion, by which they are united in our memory. Here is a kind of
ATTRACTION, which in the mental world will be found to have as
extraordinary effects as in the natural, and to shew itself in as many
and as various forms. Its effects are every where conspicuous; but as to
its causes, they are mostly unknown, and must be resolved into original
qualities of human nature, which I pretend not to explain. Nothing is
more requisite for a true philosopher, than to restrain the intemperate
desire of searching into causes, and having established any doctrine upon