THEM. A great philosopher [Dr. Berkeley.] has disputed the received
opinion in this particular, and has asserted, that all general ideas are
nothing but particular ones, annexed to a certain term, which gives them a
more extensive signification, and makes them recall upon occasion other
individuals, which are similar to them. As I look upon this to be one of
the greatest and most valuable discoveries that has been made of late
years in the republic of letters, I shag here endeavour to confirm it by
some arguments, which I hope will put it beyond all doubt and
controversy.

It is evident, that in forming most of our general ideas, if not all of
them, we abstract from every particular degree of quantity and quality,
and that an object ceases not to be of any particular species on account
of every small alteration in its extension, duration and other
properties. It may therefore be thought, that here is a plain dilemma,
that decides concerning the nature of those abstract ideas, which have
afforded so much speculation to philosophers. The abstract idea of a man
represents men of all sizes and all qualities; which it is concluded it
cannot do, but either by representing at once all possible sizes and all
possible qualities, or by, representing no particular one at all. Now it
having been esteemed absurd to defend the former proposition, as implying
an infinite capacity in the mind, it has been commonly inferred in favour
of the letter: and our abstract ideas have been supposed to represent no
particular degree either of quantity or quality. But that this inference
is erroneous, I shall endeavour to make appear, first, by proving, that
it is utterly impossible to conceive any quantity or quality, without
forming a precise notion of its degrees: And secondly by showing, that
though the capacity of the mind be not infinite, yet we can at once form a
notion of all possible degrees of quantity and quality, in such a manner
at least, as, however imperfect, may serve all the purposes of reflection