observable, that notwithstanding this imperfection we may avoid talking
nonsense on these subjects, and may perceive any repugnance among the
ideas, as well as if we had a fall comprehension of them. Thus if instead
of saying, that in war the weaker have always recourse to negotiation, we
should say, that they have always recourse to conquest, the custom, which
we have acquired of attributing certain relations to ideas, still follows
the words, and makes us immediately perceive the absurdity of that
proposition; in the same manner as one particular idea may serve us in
reasoning concerning other ideas, however different from it in several
circumstances.

Fourthly, As the individuals are collected together, said placed under a
general term with a view to that resemblance, which they bear to each
other, this relation must facilitate their entrance in the imagination,
and make them be suggested more readily upon occasion. And indeed if we
consider the common progress of the thought, either in reflection or
conversation, we shall find great reason to be satisfyed in this
particular. Nothing is more admirable, than the readiness, with which the
imagination suggests its ideas, and presents them at the very instant, in
which they become necessary or useful. The fancy runs from one end of the
universe to the other in collecting those ideas, which belong to any
subject. One would think the whole intellectual world of ideas was at
once subjected to our view, and that we did nothing but pick out such as
were most proper for our purpose. There may not, however, be any present,
beside those very ideas, that are thus collected by a kind of magical
faculty in the soul, which, though it be always most perfect in the
greatest geniuses, and is properly what we call a genius, is however
inexplicable by the utmost efforts of human understanding.

Perhaps these four reflections may help to remove an difficulties to the