of the mind is limited on both sides, and that it is impossible for the
imagination to form an adequate idea, of what goes beyond a certain
degree of minuteness as well as of greatness. Nothing can be more minute,
than some ideas, which we form in the fancy; and images, which appear to
the senses; since there are ideas and images perfectly simple and
indivisible. The only defect of our senses is, that they give us
disproportioned images of things, and represent as minute and
uncompounded what is really great and composed of a vast number of parts.
This mistake we are not sensible of: but taking the impressions of those
minute objects, which appear to the senses, to be equal or nearly equal
to the objects, and finding by reason, that there are other objects
vastly more minute, we too hastily conclude, that these are inferior to
any idea of our imagination or impression of our senses. This however is
certain, that we can form ideas, which shall be no greater than the
smallest atom of the animal spirits of an insect a thousand times less
than a mite: And we ought rather to conclude, that the difficulty lies in
enlarging our conceptions so much as to form a just notion of a mite, or
even of an insect a thousand times less than a mite. For in order to form
a just notion of these animals, we must have a distinct idea representing
every part of them, which, according to the system of infinite
divisibility, is utterly impossible, and, recording to that of
indivisible parts or atoms, is extremely difficult, by reason of the vast
number and multiplicity of these parts.



SECT. II. OF THE INFINITE DIVISIBILITY OF SPACE AND TIME.


Wherever ideas are adequate representations of objects, the relations,